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Aging has been associated with a motivational shift to positive over negative information
(i.e., positivity effect), which is often explained by a limited future time perspective (FTP)
within the framework of socioemotional selectivity theory (SST). However, whether a
limited FTP functions similarly in younger and older adults, and whether inter-individual
differences in socioemotional functioning are similarly associated with preference for
positive information (i.e., positivity) is still not clear. We investigated younger (20–
35 years, N = 73) and older (60–75 years, N = 56) adults’ gaze preferences
on pairs of happy, angry, sad, and neutral faces using an eye-tracking system.
We additionally assessed several parameters potentially underlying inter-individual
differences in emotion processing such as FTP, stress, cognitive functioning, social
support, emotion regulation, and well-being. While we found no age-related differences
in positivity when the entire trial duration was considered, older adults showed longer
fixations on the more positive face in later stages of processing (i.e., positivity shifts).
This allocation of resources toward more positive stimuli might serve an emotion
regulatory purpose and seems consistent with the SST. However, our findings suggest
that age moderates the relationship between FTP and positivity shifts, such that the
relationship between FTP and positivity preferences was negative in older, and positive
in younger adults, potentially stemming from an age-related differential meaning of the
FTP construct across age. Furthermore, our exploratory analyses showed that along
with the age and FTP interaction, lower levels of worry also played a significant role in
positivity shifts. We conclude that positivity effects cannot be solely explained by aging,
or the associated reduced FTP per se, but is rather determined by a complex interplay
of psychosocial and emotional features.
Keywords: positivity effect, positivity bias, socioemotional selectivity theory, future time perspective, well-being,
aging, socioemotional functioning, worry
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INTRODUCTION
Late adulthood has been characterized in several studies by
increased emotional stability and emotional well-being in
comparison to early adulthood (Carstensen et al., 2000, 2011).
For instance, in a cross-sectional study of younger and older
adults, the oldest age group (45–75 years old) reported having
the most positive, along with the least negative affect (Mroczek
and Kolarz, 1998). Furthermore, in several experimental settings,
older adults were shown to display more attention and memory
for positive and less for negative stimuli compared to younger
adults (Mather and Carstensen, 2003, 2005; Knight et al., 2007;
Allard and Isaacowitz, 2008). This age-group difference in greater
preference for positive over negative information in information
processing has been named the positivity effect, and it is assumed
to play an important role in emotional functioning and well-
being of the elderly (Carstensen and Mikels, 2005; Reed and
Carstensen, 2012).
While the positivity effect has been extensively studied and
replicated in many studies, and has been recognized as an
important cornerstone to explain emotional development across
the life span, some questions continue to be debated: These
concern (i) the reliability of the effect and the conditions for its
occurrence, (ii) its grounding in theory, and (iii) potential factors
modulating increased attention to positive information.
Regarding the reliability of the positivity effect, several authors
have pointed to a lack of consistency (Grühn et al., 2005).
Mixed findings were mostly attributed to differences in study
paradigms, suggesting that the positivity effect is more likely to
emerge when participants are free of explicit cognitive demands
and can allocate their attention to stimuli at their leisure (Reed
et al., 2014). Attentional deployment, which denotes diverting
attention from or reallocating attention to specific aspects
of emotional stimuli, has been suggested to be an emotion
regulation strategy according to theories on emotion regulation
(Gross, 1999). Previous studies have indicated that attentional
deployment is more often used by older rather than by younger
adults as an emotion regulatory tool (Lohani and Isaacowitz,
2014). Eye tracking allows direct and continuous assessments of
fixations, and is a useful method for a fine-grained measure of
early and sustained attention (Vazquez et al., 2016). For instance,
studies using eye tracking have shown that older adults display
positivity especially in later stages of processing (e.g., Isaacowitz
et al., 2009; Lee and Knight, 2009). Delayed onset of positivity
(i.e., shifting attention toward positive and away from negative
stimuli) would be consistent with an allocation of resources
serving an emotion regulatory purpose, supporting the thesis
that older adults with higher executive functioning show greater
positivity in information processing (Mather and Knight, 2005).
Moreover, studies using eye tracking have shown that older
adults tend to focus on mouth regions, whereas younger adults
spend more time looking at the eye regions, which is more
informative in recognizing negative expressions (Sullivan et al.,
2007). In line with this, older adults were shown to perform
worse at recognizing emotions such as anger, sadness and fear,
but show no consistent difficulties in recognizing emotions such
as happiness, surprise and disgust (Isaacowitz et al., 2007). This
brings us to question whether the positivity effect observed in
older age arise from a differentiation in focusing on different
regions of faces. Investigating gaze preferences on face stimuli
might help answer whether older adults who look more at
the mouth regions are the ones who show more positivity
effect in general.
Regarding the conceptual grounding, the positivity effect is
often explained in the framework of socioemotional selectivity
theory (SST; Carstensen et al., 1999), a life-span theory
which posits that human priorities shift with changes in
perceived time horizons. When people perceive their remaining
lifetime as limited, they tend to prioritize present goals such
as optimizing well-being over future-oriented goals such as
acquiring knowledge (Charles and Carstensen, 2010). Favoring
positive over negative stimuli in information processing has
been suggested to reflect a goal-directed, top-down regulatory
effort for optimizing emotional experience (Reed and Carstensen,
2012). Consistent with the proposal that a limited future time
perspective (FTP) drives the positivity effect, Kellough and
Knight (2012) found that imagining an open-ended FTP reduced
positivity in older adults’ perception of emotions. Interestingly,
however, imagining a limited FTP did not lead to a change
in younger adults’ interpretations of emotions in this study.
This raises the question whether the theory only consistently
applies to older adults. According to the SST, it is the perceived
remaining life time—rather than the age per se—that drives the
differences in motivation for optimizing emotional experience.
However, perceiving future life time as limited might have
different meanings for different age groups. The self-report FTP
questionnaire (Carstensen and Lang, 1996) involves items such
as “Many opportunities lie ahead of me in the future.” A person’s
only weak support for such a statement might indicate a more
realistic (for an older person), or a pessimistic attitude (for a
younger person), depending on one’s age. The idea that perceiving
future life time as limited might have different meanings for
different age groups is not explicitly discussed in positivity effect
research (within the framework of SST), although this might be a
potential qualifier to the theory (Grühn et al., 2016). Although
FTP has been the most relevant construct in explaining age
differences in the positivity effect, questions such as whether a
top-down, motivated attention to positive information would
be similarly linked to a limited FTP in younger and in older
adults, and whether any potential differences can be explained by
differences in socioemotional functioning remain open.
Finally, based on the premise that age alone is not a sufficient
causal factor for psychological processes (e.g., Baltes and Lang,
1997; Baltes et al., 2006), we reasoned that inter-individual
differences in abilities, resources, or emotional states might
contribute to an individual’s top-down motivation for positive
stimuli. In light of previous research, we examined several
socioemotional factors alongside age that might be relevant for
the positivity effect. One such factor that has been implicated
to influence top-down positivity in information processing is
cognitive functioning (Mather and Knight, 2005; Reed and
Carstensen, 2012). Another potential factor might be stress.
Compared to younger adults, older adults experience fewer
interpersonal tensions (Birditt et al., 2005), report fewer daily
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stressors (Charles et al., 2010), and avoid negative stimuli
during acute stress (Ellenbogen et al., 2002). Furthermore,
studies on emotion regulation have shown that older adults are
more likely to use distraction (Scheibe et al., 2015), and avoid
distressing situations or appraise unavoidable situations as less
severe (Stawski et al., 2008). Increased motivation for positive
information, and avoiding stressful/negative situations might be
related to the same underlying emotion regulatory mechanism.
However, although the positivity effect is assumed to have an
emotion regulatory role, how individual differences in emotion
regulation and chronic stress relates to differences in positivity in
emotion processing is not known. Availability of social support
might also be a relevant factor for positivity. Focusing primarily
on positive information would not be an evolutionarily adaptive
mechanism, as detecting negative information is necessary to
deal with potential threat or danger (LeDoux, 1995). Older
adults do not show positivity in situations where avoiding the
negative might have detrimental effects on their well-being
(English, 2012; Reed and Carstensen, 2012). Negative stimuli
or outcomes can more easily be dealt with in a group or
with perceived assistance from one’s peers, and lack of social
support might make negative effects more apparent for some
older adults (Russell and Cutrona, 1991; Dalgard et al., 1995).
Therefore, a person who lacks social support might be more
primed than others to focus more on the negative (in order to
avoid its potential negative consequences). Thus, the amount
of social support that older adults receive may modulate their
focus on positive or negative information. Finally, although
increased attention to positive information has been commonly
linked to everyday functioning and positive outcomes, i.e., well-
being (Reed and Carstensen, 2012), whether well-being is a
significant predictor of motivated, top-down attention to positive
information is not clear.
Present Study
Based on the above considerations, we pursued three main
aims in this study: (1) to identify whether there are age-
related time-course differences in gaze patterns (positivity
shift) during observation of pairs of “more positive vs. more
negative” face pictures, (2) the role of FTP in positivity
shifts, and whether FTP is similarly related to socioemotional
functioning in younger and older adults, (3) how inter-individual
differences in socioemotional functioning alongside age relate to
positivity shifts.
To pursue these aims, we used a free viewing task where
younger and older adults’ gaze patterns on pairs of happy, angry,
sad, and neutral face stimuli were recorded using an eye-tracking
system. We followed Reed and Carstensen’s (2012) definition
that “positive processing preference can result from heightened
processing of positive and/or reduced processing of negative
information” (p. 2), and quantified positivity by assessing the
relative fixation durations on the “more positive” side of the
five contrasts (happy vs. sad, happy vs. angry, happy vs. neutral,
neutral vs. angry, and neutral vs. sad). Taking into account
previous findings on delayed occurrence of positivity, we tested
whether age differences in positivity preferences differentially
emerge in early and late trial periods (i.e., positivity shifts), as
opposed to when the entire viewing period (i.e., positivity bias1)
was considered. We hypothesized that older adults would show
greater positivity for the entire trial durations, and especially
greater positivity shifts than younger adults.
In a post-hoc analysis,2 we also examined whether younger and
older adults show a differential preference for sad and angry faces.
Further analyses on gaze preferences examined whether there are
age-related differences in focusing on different regions of faces.
We hypothesized that increased positivity in older age might be
related to a preference for looking at different regions of faces.
We assessed perceived FTP in all participants. We
hypothesized that the relationship between FTP and the
positivity shift would differ as a function of age, such that a
limited FTP would be associated with greater positivity shifts in
older, but not in younger adults.
Regarding inter-individual differences, we further
hypothesized: (1) executive functioning, increased positive
emotion regulation, and higher subjective well-being would be
positively, whereas factors related to stress would be negatively
associated with positivity shifts, (2) a higher social support
would be associated with greater positivity shifts especially
in older adults, (3) the relationship between FTP and other
socioemotional functioning measures, such as well-being and
stress, would be different across the age groups.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The current study was planned and carried out as part of a larger
cross-sectional study, the “Leipzig study for mind-body-emotion
interactions” (LEMON), established at the Max Planck Institute
for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences (MPI CBS) in Leipzig
(for details, see Babayan et al., 2019).
Participants
For the LEMON study, healthy participants between the
age of 20–35 and 59–77 were recruited through the MPI
CBS’s participant database, online advertisements, and
flyers distributed in public spaces and at the University of
Leipzig, Germany. Participants were all Caucasian and native
German speakers. Exclusion criteria comprised a diagnosis of
cardiovascular (e.g., hypertension, heart attack), neurological
(e.g., multiple sclerosis, stroke), psychiatric (with inpatient
treatment > 2 weeks within the last 10 years; e.g., psychosis,
1In their meta-analysis, Murphy and Isaacowitz (2008) state that the terms such
as positivity bias, positivity effect, and negativity effect have been used liberally
throughout the literature to implicate biases for positive over negative, or for
positive and negative over neutral stimuli. We define positivity bias in our study
as greater preference for more positive stimuli during the entire trial periods. Time
course differences in positivity bias—particularly a more pronounced positivity
bias in late compared to early trial durations—would be identified as the “positivity
shift.” According to the proponents of the SST (see Reed and Carstensen, 2012), it
is this delayed positivity which marks the age differences in the positivity effect.
2We had no a priori hypothesis regarding this contrast (sad vs. angry); rather
we used this contrast as we used all pairings of happy/neutral/sad/angry faces to
counterbalance the emotional stimuli in our study. This analysis was implemented
post-hoc after finding out that previous studies have indicated differences with
respect to sadness and anger in younger and in older adults (e.g., Blanchard-Fields
and Coats, 2008; Kunzmann et al., 2014).
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PTSD; with inpatient treatment > 2 weeks within the last
10 years) or any other malignant disease (e.g., cancer);
consumption of psychoactive drugs (e.g., MDMA, THC)
or excessive alcohol; intake of centrally active medications
(amber, beta- or alpha blocker, cortisol, any chemotherapeutic,
or psychopharmacological medication); and standard MRI
exclusion criteria (e.g., metallic implants, tattoos, pregnancy,
claustrophobia). Current or past study of psychology and
previous participation in a scientific study within the last 10 years
were also among the exclusion criteria (see Babayan et al., 2019).
Inclusion to the study was performed in two steps: people
were prescreened via telephone, during which potential exclusion
criteria were assessed. Individuals who did not meet any
exclusion criterion were invited to MPI CBS and were
individually interviewed by the study physician to ensure that
none of the exclusion criteria were met. For this study, after
the exclusion criteria were applied to the full sample of 170
participants who completed the task, 12 participants were
excluded due to positive drug tests and 4 participants were
excluded due to a current alcohol or substance use disorder
diagnosed with the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-
IV (SCID-IV; First et al., 1996) measurement, leaving 154 people
for the analyses. The study was carried out in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki and the study protocol was approved
by the ethics committee at the medical faculty of the University
of Leipzig (reference number 154/13-ff). All participants signed a
consent form according to the protocols approved by the ethics
committee of the Medical Faculty at the University of Leipzig.
After eye-tracker data from 25 participants (13 older,
12 younger adults) were excluded from the analysis,3 129
participants remained for the analysis of this study. 73 were
younger (Mage = 24.49, age range: 20–35 years, 40 female) and
56 were older (Mage = 67.33, age range: 60–75 years, 35 female)
adults.
Older adults reported having longer education (in years) than
younger adults. Younger adults reported higher levels of worry,
using more positive emotion regulation strategies, and a more
open-ended FTP than older adults, and they scored higher on
cognitive functioning than older adults. There were no significant
age-related differences on well-being, lack of resources, or in
social support measures (see Table 1). Correlations between our
study variables for each group can be seen in Table 2.
Sample Size and Power
We performed the power analysis of our study on the basis of data
from Isaacowitz et al., 2009; N = 79). They found that older adults’
positivity preferences emerged only 500 ms after the stimulus
onset and increased linearly over time (effect size η2 = 0.06 for
Age Group × Emotion × Time Course). We used G∗Power 3.1
(Faul et al., 2009) to perform the power analyses. With an alpha
level of 0.05, and power of 0.95, the projected sample size that
3Some files from the eye tracker had long missing data intervals. The eye
tracker camera could not reliably detect the pupil in participants wearing glasses
(especially anti-reflective types) or hard lenses, or when the participant changed
posture, making the files unusable for analysis. Some files were corrupt, such that
the original raw files from the eye tracker could not be opened, therefore, they
could not be used for further processing.
is needed to detect an effect size of f 2 = 0.25 is 54 participants
for a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a
within and between subjects interaction. Moreover, in order to
test our hypothesis for the FTP × Age Group interaction, we
additionally performed sensitivity power analysis using “Linear
Multiple Regression: Fixed Model, R2 increase,” and calculated
the projected sample size to detect small (f 2 = 0.02), medium
(f 2 = 0.15), and large (f 2 = 0.35) effect sizes. We specified the
number of tested predictors as 1, and number of total predictors
as 3 (i.e., FTP, Age Group, and a two-way interaction that is
between FTP × Age Group). The power analysis revealed that the
projected sample size needed to be 635 to detect a small effect,
129 to detect a medium effect, and 57 to detect a large effect.
Taken together, these analyses show that our sample size of 129
should be adequate to examine the main objectives of this study,




To have a general measure of subjective well-being, we used
the “well-being” subscale of the Trait Emotional Intelligence
Questionnaire (TEIQue-SF; Petrides and Furnham, 2006;
German adaptation by Jacobs et al., 2015), which covers three
facets of well-being: Self-esteem, Trait-happiness, and Trait-
optimism. This factor has also been labeled as “trait positivity”
and has been shown to be tightly associated with life satisfaction
(Siegling et al., 2015). Items on this scale include statements such
as “On the whole, I’m pleased with my life,” and are answered
on a 7-point Likert-type scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7
(completely agree). Cronbach’s alpha for this subscale was 0.80.
Stress
Perceived stress levels were measured using two questionnaires.
The Trierer Inventar zum Chronischen Stress (TICS; Schulz and
Schlotz, 1999), which assesses chronic stress over the last 3
months with nine subscales (Work Overload, Social Overload,
Pressure to Perform, Work Discontent, Excessive Demands
at Work, Lack of Social Recognition, Social Tension, Social
Isolation, and Chronic Worrying), and the Perceived Stress
Questionnaire (PSQ; Cohen et al., 1983). The PSQ assesses the
perception, appraisal, and processing of stressors (“global stress”)
from the previous 2 years and includes four subscales: Worries,
Tension, Joy, and Demands.
As the TICS and PSQ assess related constructs, a maximum
likelihood factor analysis4 with promax oblique rotation on a
total of 13 subscales was used in the testing sample (N = 129).
Cronbach’s alpha for the 13 subscales was 0.67. The factor analysis
extracted three factors (based on Complexity 1 and Complexity
2 Criteria of Very Simple Structure, VSS; Revelle and Rocklin,
4Factor analyses in our study were mainly used for data reduction purposes.
For this factor analyses, the results were confirmed by the parallel analysis
approach (Horn’s Test of Principal Components/Factors) as well as the Very
Simple Structure approach in R (Dinno, 2012). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)
test values indicating the sampling adequacy for factor analysis for emotion
regulation, stress, and for cognitive functioning scales were 0.70, 0.84, and 0.80,
respectively.
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TABLE 1 | Demographic information and emotional and cognitive functioning measures.
Younger adults (n = 85) Older adults (n = 69) Group comparisons
M SD M SD χ2 p
Age 24.49 3.06 67.33 4.67
Sex (female:male) 45:40 35:34 0.10 0.747
M SD M SD t p
Education (in years) 13.63 1.81 14.69 1.88 −3.45 <0.001
Well-being 34.21 5.75 33.73 5.62 1.14 0.253
Stress due to lack of resources 1.29 1.34 −1.58 0.96 0.14 0.884
Burden 0.14 1.30 −1.82 0.87 1.77 0.073
Worry 0.24 1.18 −3.03 0.81 3.24 0.001
Positive emotion regulation 1.39 0.83 −1.70 0.97 2.08 0.032
Satisfaction with social support 7.14 2.00 7.46 1.79 −1.00 0.311
Practical social support 22.40 3.29 22.85 3.02 −0.85 0.392
Future time perspective 52.08 8.01 37.81 9.49 9.31 <0.001
Cognitive functioning 0.61 0.47 −0.75 0.78 13.25 <0.001
TABLE 2 | Correlations between key predictors in younger and in older adults.
Younger adults 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. PS –
2. SLR −0.08 –
3. Burden 0.04 −0.49** –
4. Worry −0.26* −0.32** −0.24* –
5. FTP 0.42*** −0.13 0.14 −0.31* –
6. SSS 0.08 −0.51*** 0.21 −0.05 0.24** –
7. PSS −0.02 −0.38*** 0.25* −0.01 0.37** 0.46*** –
8. PER −0.07 −0.15 0.22* −0.12 0.28* 0.12 0.17 –
9. Cognition 0.09 −0.11 −0.02 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.30** −0.02 –
10. Well-being 0.20 −0.47*** 0.42*** −0.31** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.36*** 0.20
Older adults 1
1. PS –
2. SLR 0.19 –
3. Burden −0.02 −0.32** –
4. Worry −0.26* −0.47* −0.04 –
5. FTP −0.27* −0.36** 0.26* 0.11 –
6. SSS 0.17 −0.01 −0.08 −0.16 −0.04 –
7. PSS 0.12 −0.35** 0.15 −0.02 0.25* 0.37** –
8. PER 0.15 0.09 0.26* −0.24* 0.04 0.25* 0.32** –
9. Cognition −0.06 −0.04 0.07 −0.17 −0.04 0.16 0.06 0.04 –
10. Well-being −0.01 −0.44*** 0.04 −0.01 0.16 0.33** 0.50*** 0.11 0.17
PS, Positivity shift; SLR, Stress due to lack of resources; FTP, Future time perspective; SSS, Satisfaction with social support; PSS, Practical social support; PER, Positive
emotion regulation. p < 0.001 “***,” p < 0.01 “**,” p < 0.05 “*.”
1979). Items with salient loadings on Factor 1 corresponded to
lack of satisfaction with one’s job and one’s social conditions;
items with high loadings on Factor 2 corresponded to subscales
related to external demands and exhaustion; items with high
loadings on Factor 3 corresponded to worry and anxiety subscales
of the TICS and PSQ. Thus, the three factors were labeled as Stress
due to Lack of Resources, Burden, and Worry, respectively.
Emotion Regulation
We used the German version of the Cognitive Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski and Spinnhoven, 2006, German
adaptation by Loch et al., 2011) to assess emotion regulation.
Only the subscales that correspond to positive emotion regulation
strategies (i.e., “Acceptance,” “Positive Refocusing,” “Refocus on
Planning,” “Putting into Perspective,” and “Positive Reappraisal”)
(Garnefski et al., 2005) were used for analysis. Cronbach’s alpha
for the five subscales was 0.73. Maximum likelihood factor
analysis with promax oblique rotation was applied on these five
subscales, with one factor extracted based on the results of Horn’s
parallel analysis (Glorfeld, 1995). A composite score was derived
using the regression scores from the factor analysis, which we
labeled as Positive Emotion Regulation.
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Social Support
It has been suggested that older adults’ perception of available
social support is a stronger predictor of well-being than the actual
support they receive (Auslander and Litwin, 1991; Newsom and
Schulz, 1996). To have a measure for both practical and perceived
support, we used two subscales of Fragebogen zur Sozialen
Unterstützung (F-SozU; Fydrich et al., 2009) that correspond to
the receipt of Practical Social Support (PSS) as well as the personal
Satisfaction with Social Support (SSS) received. Cronbach’s alpha
for these subscales were 0.82 and 0.65, respectively.
Future Time Perspective
We used the German version of the 10-item Future Time
Perspective Scale (FTP; Carstensen and Lang, 1996) to assess
perceived limitations on time. Sample items in this scale include:
“Many opportunities await me in the future” and “Most of my life
(still) lies ahead of me.” Answers were given on a 7-point Likert-
type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Cronbach’s alpha for this subscale was 0.87.
Cognition
We chose measures of cognition based on previous research
relating top-down emotion regulation to executive functioning
(Ochsner and Gross, 2005). We derived a score for cognitive and
executive function across the domains of speed of processing,
attention/vigilance, working memory, and visual learning. For
this purpose we used the following tests: (1) Part A and B from
the Trail Making Test (TMT; Reitan, 1992), the 2-back task from
Testbatterie zur Aufmerksamkeitsprüfung (TAP; Zimmermann
and Fimm, 2012) using mistakes and omissions, and the Simon-
effect score (Simon and Small, 1969) for working memory; (2)
The LPS 4 (subtest 4 of the German intelligence test battery
Leistungsprüfungssystem (LPS; Horn, 1983) for fluid intelligence;
(3) The two subscales of the Regensburger Wortflüssigkeitstest
(RWT; Aschenbrenner et al., 2000) for verbal memory, and a
learned sum score of California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT;
Niemann et al., 2008). Cronbach’s alpha for these subscales was
0.63. We used Very Simple Structure in R in order to screen for
the number of factors. The VSS complexity 1 suggested one factor
solution with a fit value of 0.75, which was congruent with the
number that was suggested by the Velicer Minimum Average
Partial (MAP; Velicer, 1976) criterion. A composite score was
derived for cognitive functioning for each participant using the
regression scores from the maximum likelihood factor analysis
with a promax oblique rotation.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Face stimuli were used to measure visual attention to emotional
stimuli. These stimuli consisted of high-resolution, front-view
photographs of Caucasian faces that were taken from the FACES
database5 (Ebner et al., 2010). “Happy,” “angry,” “sad,” and
5The arousal levels of the faces have not been controlled for in this study. After
the eye tracker study, participants were asked to rate 48 novel face stimuli from
the FACES database. They were instructed to rate the intensity level of angry, sad,
happy, and neutral faces according to how happy, angry, and sad the faces looked
on a Likert-type scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). The faces were again
counterbalanced for age group (young/middle-aged/old faces), sex (male/female),
“neutral” facial expressions from 144 individuals were randomly
selected from a pool of 171 individuals using a customized
MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, United States) script. Two
emotional expressions from each of these 144 individuals were
again randomly selected for each participant from the pool of 576
pictures (i.e., 4 emotion categories from 144 faces) and presented
in a counterbalanced fashion for age (young/middle/old), sex
(female/male), emotion type (happy/angry/sad/neutral), and
picture presentation position (left/right).
Stimuli were presented using Presentation Software
(Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Berkeley, CA, United States). We
recorded participants’ left eye movements with a sampling rate of
1,000 Hz using an Eyelink 1,000 eye tracker system (SR Research
Ltd., Ottawa, Canada). A chin-rest was used to limit head
movements. The stimuli were presented on a 22-inch Ilyama
CRT monitor positioned 80 cm away from the participant.
Task Design and Procedure
Before the recording session, participants performed a 9-point
eye calibration test in order to ensure an accurate mapping
between the eye orientation and eye tracker measurements. Next,
participants were presented with a sequence of face pairs—two
pictures of the same person would appear simultaneously on the
left and right side of a fixation cross—and were instructed to
“view the images naturally as if at home watching television”
(Isaacowitz et al., 2006). In 144 trials, participants were presented
with 10 combinations of facial emotions: 48 trials, in which
both faces showed the same emotion (happy–happy, sad–sad,
angry–angry, neutral–neutral) and 96 trials, in which the emotion
differed between the left and the right face (happy–sad, happy–
angry, happy–neutral, neutral–angry, neutral–sad, sad–angry).
The latter were counterbalanced for positive–negative, positive–
neutral, neutral–negative, and negative–negative contrasts. Each
picture (pairing of an individual face and a specific emotion)
appeared only once for each participant. Trials, in which both
faces showed the same emotion (e.g., happy–happy), were used
as filler trials to mask the aim of the study. Each pair was
presented for 3,000 ms with a 1,500 ms fixation cross between
trials. Participants were tested in a quiet room and left alone
during the eye-tracking session.
Data Analysis
Eye tracker files were processed using customized MATLAB
(MathWorks, Natick, MA, United States) scripts, and statistical
analyses on the fixations were carried out using the R Software
(Version 3.1, R Development Core Team, 2008). As a first step,
trials with the same emotional expression on both sides were
discarded. Since the experimental stimuli were presented in
pairs, for the remaining 96 trials of happy–angry, happy–sad,
happy–neutral, neutral–sad, neutral–angry, sad–angry face pairs,
and emotional expression (sad/angry/neutral/happy). This task was carried out to
investigate emotional perception and is not directly linked to the current study.
The results will be reported elsewhere. We do not report these results here—as
a manipulation check—since the stimuli in these two tasks were not the same.
However, since the younger and older participants rated the same 48 faces, it might
be relevant to report that we found that younger and older adults did not show
differences in the overall accuracy of labeling the emotions.
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Fixation Ratio Scores (FRS; Isaacowitz et al., 2006) were calculated
to assess relative looking patterns on both side of these pairs. We
used durations rather than number of fixations, given that this is
generally considered to be a better proxy for capturing attentional
biases (Allard and Isaacowitz, 2008).
Percent of total fixation duration on each side of face pairs
for each contrast were quantified for each participant relative
to the total duration of fixations on both pairs for the entire
3,000 ms trial duration, and separately for the first (0–1,500 ms)
and second half (1,500–3,000 ms) of the trial duration time.
A fixation ratio over 50% would indicate gaze preference toward
the more positive face.
We carried out two ANOVA analyses to investigate overall
age differences: (1) For the entire 3,000 ms trial durations
(positivity bias) using a two-way mixed-effects ANOVA with Age
Group (younger/older adults) as a between-subject variable, and
five emotion contrasts (happy–angry, happy–sad, happy–neutral,
neutral–sad, and neutral–angry) as within-subject variables, and
percent of total fixation duration on happy (in happy vs.
angry/sad/neutral), and neutral (in neutral vs. angry/sad pairings)
faces in these contrasts as the dependent variable,6 (2) by adding
time course to the previous analysis: with a 2 (Age Group)
× 2 (Time Course: Early/Late Trial Duration) × 5 (Emotion
Contrasts) mixed effects ANOVA, in order to examine whether
younger and older adults’ gaze preferences for the more positive
face were different in late (last 1,500 ms) compared to the early
trial periods (first 1,500 ms) (positivity shifts).7 A potential Age
Group × Time Course interaction would implicate that the time
course of positivity differs between younger and older adults.
Next, we quantified an index for positivity shifts for each
participant to conduct further analyses. We subtracted the
percent of total fixation durations on the “more positive” side
(i.e., to happy faces paired with negative and neutral faces, and
to neutral faces paired with angry or sad faces) of pairs of the first
half (first 1,500 ms) from the second half (last 1,500 ms) of the
entire trial duration (3,000 ms). We then quantified individual
levels of positivity shift (the positivity shift index) by taking
the average of these five values, in order to perform regression
analyses to examine our hypotheses related to the role of inter-
individual differences.
We performed two separate analyses on positivity shifts:
(1) We tested the moderator role of age on the relationship
between the positivity shift and FTP. We used age as a categorical
variable interacting with FTP to investigate differential effects
of age group with FTP. Predictors were centered (z-scored), a
method suggested in order to reduce multicollinearity (Cohen
et al., 2003). Significant interactions were subsequently probed by
simple slope analyses.
(2) Using multiple regression analysis, we examined how
other socioemotional predictors alongside age are associated with
6We included participant sex as a within-subject covariate in our preliminary
mixed-effects ANOVA analyses (both for positivity bias and positivity shift) to
see whether it significantly relates to positivity preferences. We collapsed the data
across participant sex when no main effect of sex or any interactions between sex
and other variables emerged.
7The same analysis was carried out on late vs. early trial durations for the sad vs.
angry contrast.
positivity shifts. Age was entered in the analyses as a continuous
variable interacting with the predictors to capture possible non-
linear interactions between age and the predictors. All predictors
were again centered before computing the interaction term.
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) and their tolerance indices were
used to assess how much the variance of the coefficient estimate
is being inflated by multicollinearity. Predictors were again
centered (z-scored). The VIF scores for the multiple regression
analyses were all below five.
We first compared two models. In the full model, the positivity
shift score was regressed onto age, interacting with stress (lack
of resources, burden, worry), FTP, practical social support,
satisfaction with social support, positive emotion regulation,
cognitive functioning, and well-being. The null model comprised
only age as a continuous variable predicting positivity shifts. The
reduced model comprised significant primary interactions from
the initial model.
Pearson’s correlations were used to evaluate the relationships
between the study variables in the two age groups separately (see
Table 2). We used r-to-z transformations to compare correlations
between younger and older adults. For all subsequent statistical
analyses, we used a two-sided alpha level of 0.05 with 95%
confidence intervals, and Cohen’s d or partial eta squared (ηp2)
for measuring the effect size.
RESULTS
Age Group Differences in Gaze
Preferences to Face Pairs
Positivity Bias
We examined overall age differences in fixation durations on
happy and neutral face stimuli (in happy vs. angry/sad/neutral,
and neutral vs. angry/sad contrasts) for the entire 3,000 ms trial
period (positivity bias) using a 2 (Age Group) × 5 (Contrast Type)
mixed-effects ANOVA. The main effect of age group was not
significant, F(1, 127) = 0.45, p = 0.502, ηp2 = 0.00, indicating
no overall significant age difference between younger and older
adults’ preferences to more positive stimuli when the entire 3 s
trial period was considered.
Positivity Shifts
Fixation durations on the more positive side of the five contrasts
in late compared to the early trial periods examined by 2 ×
2 × 5 mixed-effects ANOVA revealed a significant interaction
between Age Group × Time Course, F(1, 127) = 4.68, p = 0.032,
ηp
2= 0.03, and between Age Group × Contrast Type, F(4,
1,018) = 5.65, p < 0.001, ηp2= 0.02 (see Figure 1). Post-hoc
pairwise Tukey t-tests showed that the fixation durations on
more positive stimuli in late (M = 56.7, SD = 1.64) compared
to early trials (M = 52, SD = 1.19) were significantly different
in older adults t(127) = −4.11, p < 0.001, d = 0.58, but not
in younger adults (early M = 51.7, SD = 0.72, late M = 53.5,
SD = 1.22), t(127) = −1.41, p = 0.493, d = 0.17, indicating that
older adults’ fixations on more positive faces increased in the
late trial period. Although we were mainly interested in overall
age-related differences in positivity in early and late trials, we
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FIGURE 1 | Fixation shifts of younger and older adults on face pairs as measured by the eye tracker. Error bars represent mean shifts; 0 represents zero shifts to
either side of a pair, values over 0 represent more shifts to the first emotional expression on each pair on the x-axis.
also examined the interaction between Age-group × Contrast,
however, we found no age-group differences for any relevant
contrast for the two age groups. The Age Group × Time Course
× Contrast Type was not significant (p = 0.718).
Fixation Durations on Sad vs. Angry Faces in
Early/Late Trial Periods
Age differences in gaze preferences to sad vs. angry face stimuli
in late compared to early trial durations were examined using a
two-way mixed-design ANOVA, with Age Group (younger/older
adults) as the between-subject factor, Time Course (early/late)
as within-subject factor, and percent of total fixation duration
on sad faces as the dependent variable. This analysis revealed a
significant main effect of Time Course, F(1, 252) = 6.98, p = 0.008,
ηp
2 = 0.02. Age Group, F(1, 252) = 2.88, p = 0.090, ηp2 = 0.01,
and the interaction between Age Group × Time Course, F(1,
252) = 2.98, p = 0.085, ηp2 = 0.01, were not statistically
significant.
Fixation Durations on Upper or Lower Parts of Faces
We tested whether younger and older adults showed differences
in attending to upper (i.e., toward the eye region of faces)
or lower part (i.e., more mouth region of the face) of facial
stimuli. Younger adults had overall longer durations of fixations
on the upper part of faces than older adults, t(92) = 2.77,
p = 0.006. A two-way mixed-design ANOVA, with Age Group
(younger/older adults) as the between-subject factor, four
emotion categories (happy/sad/angry/neutral) as within-subject
factor, and percent of total fixation duration on the upper
part of these four emotional expressions as the dependent
variable showed that the effect of the age group was significant,
[F(1, 3) = 37.73, p < 0.001], indicating that older adults’
fixations on lower part of faces were significantly longer across
happy, sad, angry, and neutral faces. Linear regression analysis
where positivity shifts were regressed onto percentage of fixation
durations on upper part of faces in interaction with the age group
was not statistically significant [F(2, 126) = 1.67, p = 0.192],
indicating that fixation durations on upper or lower parts of faces
were not significantly associated with positivity shifts in neither
group.
Moderating Role of Age for the
Relationship Between Positivity Shift and
FTP
We examined whether the relationship between positivity shifts
and FTP is moderated by age. Positivity shift scores were
regressed onto FTP, Age Group, and the interaction between
FTP and Age Group. Age Group, (b = 4.17, SEb = 1.73,
β = 0.26, p = 0.017), and FTP, (b = 0.44, SEb = 0.44, β = 0.64,
p < 0.001) showed significant main effects, qualified by a
significant interaction between FTP × Age Group (b = -0.63,
SEb = 0.15, β = -0.61, p < 0.001), indicating that FTP’s association
with positivity shifts was positive in younger (b = 0.44, SEb = 0.11,
p < 0.001), and negative in older adults (b = -0.19, SEb = 0.10,
p = 0.061) (see Figure 2).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 November 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 567133
fpsyg-11-567133 November 11, 2020 Time: 15:26 # 9
Erbey et al. Differences in Positivity Across Age
FIGURE 2 | Age × FTP interaction for the positivity shift. Positivity shift and
FTP are mean centered by age group. Lines represent lines of best fit from the
regression analysis.
To test whether FTP might have different meanings
across age, we additionally examined correlations between our
predictors (see Table 2). Comparing correlations using r-to-z
transformation, we assessed whether the correlation between FTP
and socioemotional functioning variables (e.g., well-being, and
worry) differ in magnitude in the younger and in the older
adults. FTP was positively associated with well-being levels in the
younger, and negatively in the older adults (Younger: r = 0.47,
p < 0.001, Older: r = 0.16, p = 0.19, r-to-z value: z = 1.95, p = 0.02).
FTP’s association to worry also differed between the younger
and older adults (Younger: r = -0.31, p < 0.01, Older: r = 0.11,
p = 0.41, r-to-z value: z = −2.36, p < 0.001).
The Role of Inter-individual Differences
in Positivity Shifts
To examine whether predictors related to socioemotional
functioning that we measured alongside age are associated with
positivity shifts, multiple regression analyses were performed.
To test the significance of the predictors as a whole, we
compared the fit of the full model (where the positivity shift
score was regressed onto age, lack of resources, burden, worry,
FTP, practical social support, satisfaction with social support,
positive emotion regulation, cognitive functioning, and well-
being) with that of the null model comprising only age. Age
was entered as a continuous variable in interaction with the
other predictors to examine whether within group differences
in predictors differentially relate to positivity shifts across age.
Overall, the comparison of the full model with all the predictors
to the null model that comprised only age was significant [F(19,
93) = 1.97, p = 0.019]. The full model revealed a significant
regression equation [F(19, 93) = 2.09, R2 = 0.29, p = 0.010]. Age
and FTP showed a significant interaction (b = -0.01, SEb = 0.00,
p < 0.001). Non-significant interactions from the full model
were removed to form the reduced model which comprised Age
and FTP interaction, and the remaining predictors. Along with
a significant Age and FTP interaction, worry had a significant
effect (b = −1.99, SEb = 0.92, p = 0.034), indicating a negative
association with positivity shifts across age (for full and reduced
models see Table 3).
DISCUSSION
We investigated younger and older adults’ gaze preferences on
different pairings of angry, sad, happy, and neutral face stimuli,
and how inter-individual factors related to socioemotional
functioning, most relevant FTP, might be associated with greater
attention to the more positive faces. While we did not observe
any significant age-group difference in overall gaze preferences
to the face pairs when the entire trial duration was considered,
older adults showed greater attentional shifts to more positive
stimuli in later stages of processing (i.e., positivity shifts).
As expected, FTP was more limited in the elderly group.
Interestingly, however, age moderated the relationship between
positivity shifts and FTP, such that the relationship between
the FTP and positivity shifts was positive in the younger, and
negative in the older adults. While positivity shifts in younger
adults were modulated by inter-individual differences related to
socioemotional functioning, this was not the case in older adults.
Similarly, the relationship between FTP and other socioemotional
factors also differed across age.
Age Similarities and Differences in Gaze
Preferences to Emotional Stimuli
Our results support the existence of a positivity effect, but
suggest that an age-dependent group difference in attention
toward “positive information” needs to be qualified by additional
parameters. We found that the age-dependent group effect only
emerged when the temporal dynamics of gaze patterns were
examined. Specifically, although both groups showed strikingly
similar gaze patterns on face pairs and more attention to the
more positive face during later stages of processing (see Figure 1),
gaze preferences for the more positive face in late compared
to early trial durations were significantly stronger in the older
adults. A delayed occurrence of positivity seems consistent with
an emotion regulatory mechanism which takes into account the
first (random sequence) observations and subsequently guides
attention toward the more positive image. Thus, this finding
might support the argument that the positivity effect might reflect
motivated cognition in older adults to a greater extent than it
does in younger adults, and is congruent with previous studies
which also showed a delayed onset of positivity in older adults
(Isaacowitz et al., 2009; Lee and Knight, 2009).
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TABLE 3 | Summary of the initial multiple regression analysis with all predictors, and the reduced model with significant interactions from the initial model.
Predictor b b 95% CI sr2 sr2 95% CI Fit
(Intercept) 0.69 [−1.95, 3.33]
Age 1.16 [−1.80, 4.13] 0.00 [−0.02, 0.03]
Lack of resources −1.65 [−3.91, 0.60] 0.02 [−0.02, 0.05]
Burden −1.20 [−3.05, 0.64] 0.01 [−0.02, 0.05]
Worry −2.03* [−3.95, -0.11] 0.03 [−0.02, 0.09]
Future time perspective 2.23* [0.07, 4.39] 0.03 [−0.02, 0.09]
Satisfaction with social support −0.80 [−2.59, 0.99] 0.01 [−0.02, 0.03]
Practical social support −0.18 [−2.18, 1.83] 0.00 [−0.00, 0.00]
Positive emotion regulation −0.37 [−1.97, 1.23] 0.00 [−0.01, 0.01]
Cognition −0.44 [−2.97, 2.08] 0.00 [−0.01, 0.01]
Well-being −0.28 [−2.25, 1.68] 0.00 [−0.01, 0.01]
Age × Lack of resources 2.20 [−0.06, 4.45] 0.03 [−0.02, 0.08]
Age × Burden 1.16 [−0.61, 2.93] 0.01 [−0.02, 0.05]
Age × Worry 0.73 [−1.20, 2.66] 0.00 [−0.02, 0.02]
Age × FTP −3.53** [−5.40, -1.66] 0.11 [0.01, 0.20]
Age × Satisfaction with social support 1.40 [−0.44, 3.25] 0.02 [−0.02, 0.06]
Age × Practical social support 1.69 [−0.43, 3.82] 0.02 [−0.02, 0.06]
Age × Positive emotion regulation 0.53 [−1.11, 2.18] 0.00 [−0.01, 0.02]
Age × Cognition −0.64 [−3.09, 1.81] 0.00 [−0.01, 0.02]
Age × Well-being −0.13 [−2.00, 1.73] 0.00 [−0.00, 0.00]
R2 = 0.29* 95%CI [0.02, 0.31]
(Intercept) 1.27 [−0.51, 3.06]
Age 0.94 [−1.95, 3.83] 0.00 [−0.02, 0.02]
Future time perspective 1.53 [−0.52, 3.58] 0.02 [−0.03, 0.06]
Lack of resources −0.99 [−3.14, 1.16] 0.01 [−0.02, 0.03]
Burden −0.75 [−2.51, 1.01] 0.01 [−0.02, 0.03]
Worry −1.99* [−3.84, -0.15] 0.04 [−0.03, 0.10]
Satisfaction with social support 0.07 [−1.62, 1.76] 0.00 [−0.00, 0.00]
Practical social support −0.57 [−2.46, 1.31] 0.00 [−0.01, 0.02]
Positive emotion regulation −0.10 [−1.68, 1.49] 0.00 [−0.00, 0.00]
Cognition −0.53 [−2.88, 1.81] 0.00 [−0.01, 0.01]
Well-being −0.22 [−2.07, 1.62] 0.00 [−0.01, 0.01]
Age × FTP −2.98** [−4.70, -1.27] 0.09 [−0.00, 0.19]
R2= 0.21** 95%CI [0.02, 0.27]
A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation
squared. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01.
Furthermore, results from the ANOVA analysis gave no
indication that age differences in positivity shifts differentially
emerged for a particular contrast (for happy vs. sad, happy vs.
angry, happy vs. neutral, neutral vs. angry, and neutral vs. sad
contrasts). Based on previous reports regarding the differential
processing of particularly negative emotions such as sadness and
anger across age (Blanchard-Fields and Coats, 2008; Streubel
and Kunzmann, 2011; Kunzmann et al., 2014), we conducted
an exploratory analysis to test whether younger and older adults
show a differential preference for sad or angry faces (in sad vs.
angry contrast) in late compared to early trial durations, but failed
to observe a significant Age × Emotion interaction. Both groups
fixated longer on the angry face in late compared to early trial
durations (see also Figure 1).
We also examined whether there are age-related differences
in focusing on different regions of faces, and whether these
relate to positivity shifts. In line with previous findings,
younger adults spent more time looking at the eye regions,
whereas older adults on mouth regions, independent of the
emotional expression displayed. This has been suggested to be a
compensatory mechanism for hearing loss that often accompany
increasing age, through older adults’ increased reliance on visible
speech (Thompson, 1995). We had hypothesized that increased
positivity in gaze preferences to more positive faces might be
related to this age-related differentiation in focusing on different
regions of faces, however, our results did not support this link.
Eyes provide social cues, so it might be the case that older adults
miss on important aspects of communication due to this trade-
off. However, this did not seem to be related to greater shifts
to positive faces in older age, possibly since older adults fixated
longer at the mouth region of the faces independent of the
emotion displayed.
Taken together, our results show that younger and older adults’
positivity preferences did not significantly differ according to
the stimulus type (i.e., groups showed more similarities than
differences in their gaze preferences to face pairs), and for each
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 November 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 567133
fpsyg-11-567133 November 11, 2020 Time: 15:26 # 11
Erbey et al. Differences in Positivity Across Age
contrast, both groups on average showed a shift toward the more
positive face (when comparing late vs. early trial durations, see
Figure 1). However, the overall shifts to more positive faces
were significantly higher for older compared to younger adults,
supporting SST’s notion that a motivational shift to more positive,
emotionally gratifying information increases with age.
The Role of FTP in Positivity and
Socioemotional Functioning in Younger
and in Older Adults
Previous reports have emphasized the role of limited FTP in the
positivity effect using the theoretical framework of SST. Despite
its presumably important role, a few studies that have used a
questionnaire-based FTP did not observe any significant links to
behavioral assessments of positivity (e.g., Demeyer and De Raedt,
2013; Bohn et al., 2016). Rather than manipulating participants’
perceived future time by asking them to imagine a limited or
an open-ended FTP (which was the method mostly used by
previous studies), we investigated whether how one perceives
future time would moderate the relationship between positivity
shifts and age. We reasoned that between-person differences in
FTP would differentially be related to positivity across age groups,
based on the assumption that perceiving one’s remaining life as
limited (as operationalized by the FTP questionnaire) might have
a different meaning, and therefore different behavioral outcomes
for younger and older adults. One important aim of our study was
to investigate this hypothesis.
Regarding the age-related differences, we confirmed that
FTP was more limited in the older group, who also showed
stronger gaze preferences for the more positive face. However,
we found that the interaction between FTP and the age
group in predicting the positivity shift was significant (see
Figure 2). In line with our prediction, FTP was more negatively
associated with positivity shifts in the older group, while
a more positive relationship was observed in the younger
adults. For the older group, increased preference for positive
stimuli especially in the later stages of processing (e.g., more
controlled as opposed to automatic, reflexive processes) being
driven by a limited FTP seems consistent with the tenet of
the SST that age-related positivity is related to a change in
FTP. However, this did not seem to apply to the younger
people in our study. This is similar to Kellough and Knight’s
(2012) finding, where the authors experimentally manipulated
participants’ time perspective, and found that while imagining
a more expanded life span decreased positivity in older adults’
perception of emotions, imagining a limited FTP did not
have an effect on younger adults’ perception of emotions.
Although the FTP has been measured differently in these studies,
these similar findings regarding the moderator role of age
suggest that positivity in information processing depend on
both age and FTP.
The different outcomes of FTP on positivity as a function
of age might be related to a different meaning that a limited
FTP might have for the two age groups. In line with this, we
observed that FTP’s associations with worry and well-being levels
showed significant differences between the age-groups, such that
the negative associations of FTP to worry and well-being were
more significant in the younger adults.
While FTP is claimed to be the driving force behind the
positivity effect and higher levels of well-being in the elderly,
Grühn et al. (2016) showed FTP to be inversely related to
socioemotional functioning independent of age. In our study,
an open-ended FTP indicated a more adaptive socioemotional
profile in younger adults, given its highly significant association
with well-being, where in older adults no such link was observed.
The FTP measure used in our study, as conceptualized by
Lang and Carstensen (2002), captures whether an individual
perceives the future in positive or negative light. One of the
questions included in the FTP scale is to what extent individuals
perceive their future to be full of opportunities. One would
expect an older person’s answer to this question to be less
affirmative than a younger person’s. For a younger person
with a more limited or constrained outlook into the future,
the negative consequences for their current well-being can be
deemed expected. On the other hand, for an older individual,
not perceiving the future to be full of opportunities would most
probably have a lessened impact on their current well-being.
In other words, it might be possible that the different ends
of the scale implicate different things for younger and older
adults, and that the relationship between the instrument (the FTP
questionnaire) to the underlying construct is not linear. While
the SST treats FTP as a unidimensional construct, it has been
suggested that FTP is a two-factor or multidimensional construct
(Cate and John, 2007). While this is not elaborated in the theory,
some authors suggest that only specific facets of FTP might
indicate positive socioemotional functioning. Our findings, along
with the mixed findings observed about the links between FTP
and socioemotional functioning, show that the relationship is
nuanced. While more data are needed to draw firmer conclusions,
based on our findings—particularly the relationship between
FTP and well-being—we suggest that FTP (as assessed by the
FTP measure) might reflect different socioemotional profiles
depending on the phase of life. Future studies should consider
the potential qualifier role of age in their assessments of FTP
along with positivity in information processing or socioemotional
functioning.
The Role of Inter-individual Differences
in Positivity
Based on our assumption that inter-individual differences
in abilities, resources, or emotional states might contribute
to an individual’s top-down motivation for positive stimuli,
we conducted exploratory analyses to look at the role of
stress, emotion regulation, social support, well-being, cognitive
functioning, and FTP, examining the effect of these alongside age
in positivity shifts. Interestingly, we found that inter-individual
differences in socioemotional factors were more significantly
related to positivity shifts than age by itself, supporting the notion
that age alone is not a sufficient causal factor for psychological
processes (e.g., Baltes and Lang, 1997; Baltes et al., 2006), such as
the positivity effect. These analyses also confirmed the interaction
between age and FTP.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 November 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 567133
fpsyg-11-567133 November 11, 2020 Time: 15:26 # 12
Erbey et al. Differences in Positivity Across Age
Some of the relationships that we hypothesized were not
supported (i.e., the role of well-being, social support, and
emotion regulation in positivity shifts). Although the positivity
effect is claimed to be a top-down, motivationally driven
process that relies on cognitive resources, our study failed to
demonstrate a significant role for cognitive functioning for
top-down, motivational shifts to more positive stimuli. This is
consistent with a recent study which examined the association
of positivity in memory and attention with performance on
cognitive tasks, and found limited evidence (Barber et al.,
2020). Unlike studies that associated cognitive functioning with
positivity effects, studies that used manipulations of cognitive
resources have shown different results. For instance, a previous
study that examined the role of emotionally valanced distractors
on the encoding of negative stimuli found no interference
effects for positive distractors in memory for negative targets,
supporting the role of autonomic rather than effortful processing
of positive distractors (Ziaei et al., 2015). Likewise, Mather and
Carstensen (2003) found that compared to younger adults, older
adults avoided emotionally negative faces during a cognitive task,
supporting the claim that positivity relies on cognitive resources.
Fox and Knight (2005) examined the hypothesis whether trait
and state anxiety mediated the relationship between positivity
and cognition, and showed although there was a tendency for
older adults without anxiety to avoid attending to negative stimuli
during a cognitive task, older adults who were induced into
anxious moods showed selective attention to threat similar with
younger adults. This suggests an important role for anxiety in
positivity in emotion processing. Consistent with this, among
the stress measures that we examined (i.e., stress due to lack of
resources, worry, and burden), worry was significantly related to
positivity shifts, in that higher levels of worry were associated
with fewer shifts to more positive faces across age.
Worry is characterized by “a chain of thoughts and
images, negatively affect-laden, and relatively uncontrollable; it
represents an attempt to engage in mental problem-solving on
an issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility
of one or more negative outcomes; consequently, worry relates
closely to the fear process” (Borkovec et al., 1983, p. 10). For these
reasons, worry is a common feature of most anxiety disorders
(Beck and Clark, 1997). Significant attentional biases to negative
or threatening stimuli have been reported in individuals high
in trait anxiety (Quigley et al., 2012), and in participants who
were induced into an anxious mood (Goodwin et al., 2017). Our
finding that higher levels of worry are associated with fewer
shifts to positive faces is congruent with these studies, however,
this contrasts with claims that younger and older adults use
positive gaze for different reasons (such that older adults use
positive gaze in negative mood states, whereas younger adults
show more mood congruent looking patterns) (Isaacowitz et al.,
2008; Isaacowitz and Noh, 2011).
Indeed, increased positivity in older as compared to younger
adults might as well be due to decreased levels of worry in
older age, a very significant age-group difference that we also
observed in our data (see Table 1), similar with past research
(Hunt et al., 2003). For instance, worries about finances and
social events are more frequent in younger than in older adults
(Powers et al., 1992). It has been noted that psychological distress
and mental health problems have become more widespread
among the younger populations over the last twenty years
(Sweeting et al., 2010; Mojtabai and Jorm, 2015), which have
been linked to changes in national labor and market trends
(Lager and Bremberg, 2009). Employment and the labor markets
during the 1970s were “secure,” but they have since become
increasingly “polarized and precarious” (Dannefer and Huang,
2017). For instance, the crises of 1980s brought about an increase
in the number of suicides in Spain, which coincided with greater
increases in unemployment (McKee and Stuckler, 2001). Thus,
the increase in precariousness might be the reason for increased
levels of anxiety among the young populations. If worry in
younger populations is increasing due to social and economic
changes, this change might hypothetically also be reflected in the
positivity levels of younger adults (such as in emotion processing,
or in affect domains), and to the age-related difference observed
in these groups. The reliance of the positivity effect on worry
could explain why the positivity effect, which has initially been
identified and conceptualized in 2005 by Mather and Carstensen,
might be influenced by cohort effects. This would also explain
the inconsistencies found in previous research. For instance, age-
related differences to positive over negative stimuli observed in
US Americans were not observed in Hong Kong Chinese (Fung
et al., 2008). Cohort effects have also been established on well-
being, in that the well-being of cohorts in the US that lived
through the economic challenges of the early twentieth century
was lower than those born during more prosperous times (Sutin
et al., 2013). Possibly also related to this, the strongest negative
correlate of well-being in our data was lack of resources, which
depicted satisfaction with one’s job and social conditions.
From this perspective, a differential relationship of FTP to
positivity shifts in younger and older adults and the stronger
link between perceived limited FTP and worry in younger adults
would make sense. This is possibly because FTP comprises ideas
such as “many opportunities lie ahead of me in the future.”
Younger adults who are pessimistic about their future and who
think the future does not bear many opportunities for them might
be more prompted to focus on the negative information.
One is more prompted to focus on the negative when one
feels unsafe or threatened. When one feels more secure, it
might be easier to afford to pay attention to the positive in the
environment. There is little reason as to why this should be
different in younger and in older adults. Rather than focusing
on age-group differences, studies should try to identify why
these differences emerge between younger and older groups, and
include inter-individual assessments related to socioemotional
functioning. Taken together, our study extends the prior literature
by showing that along with the interaction between Age and FTP,
lower levels of worry are important factors for increased positivity
in emotion processing in general, pointing to the necessity of
studying inter-individual differences in psychological constructs
in positivity effect research.
Limitations, Caveats, and Future Directions
An important limitation of our study lies in its cross-sectional
nature and its heavy reliance on self-report data. Drawing
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on the findings that the positivity effect mostly emerges
when participants are free from experimental constraints (Reed
et al., 2014), we chose a relatively simple task, in which
the participants passively viewed pairs of face stimuli. Since
this kind of task does not implicate any emotional response
on the part of the participants, they cannot be claimed
to test emotion regulation (Isaacowitz and Blanchard-Fields,
2012). Since we did not manipulate gaze or other measures
we used (i.e., well-being, emotion regulation, FTP, etc.), but
rather examined associations between behavioral assessments of
positivity and self-report data in light of our hypotheses, we
cannot draw conclusions about causal pathways underlying the
positivity effect and associated outcomes for well-being. Studying
age-related changes in emotion processing with ambulatory
assessments and/or in longitudinal designs would be more
desirable to establish such links.
An important focus of our study was to investigate the
theoretical grounding of the positivity effect. We therefore
investigated the role, and indirectly the meaning of FTP, as it
has been treated as the most relevant construct to explain the
age differences in emotion processing. Since previous reports
have claimed increased positivity—suggested to be driven by a
limited FTP—to have a potential role for the well-being of older
adults (Reed and Carstensen, 2012), it would be interesting to
test the role of well-being levels in the relationship between
positivity and FTP, and whether this relationship might differ
across the age groups. While our study did not have enough
statistical power for this three-way interaction, we provide data
on this exploratory analysis (detailed results are reported in
the Supplementary Material). We observed that the negative
relationship between FTP and positivity indicated older adults
with lower well-being levels. Since this analysis did not have
sufficient statistical power, its results are speculative at this point.
Nevertheless, we regard this worthwhile to be pursued further (in
studies with adequate power). Our data will be publicly available
for future meta-analyses.
Another important thing to add is that the older adults in
the current study, in contrast to previous research (Mroczek
and Kolarz, 1998), did not report higher well-being as compared
to younger adults. Surprisingly also, younger adults in our
study reported using more positive emotion regulation than
older adults. It might be worth noting that most of the older
adults who took part in this study have lived in the former
German Democratic Republic (GDR). With the fall of the Berlin
Wall, people who had lived in the GDR suddenly experienced
a great amount of instability and change. The experience of
stability and continuity is essential to an individual’s well-
being (Westerhof and Keyes, 2006). Thus, one reason that
older adults did not report higher life satisfaction than younger
adults might be related to this, given that the age-related
differences in positive affect are suggested to be small, and hard to
disentangle from cohort effects (Kunzmann et al., 2000). Future
studies might consider including measurements of important life
events (such as important personal or health-related changes),
measures related worry, anxiety, job and social security, and
whether positivity in older adults is still maintained in face of a
potential health threat (such as a pandemic like Covid-19 which
poses a stronger risk for elderly people), which could provide
new insights into the positivity effect and its relationship to
socioemotional functioning.
CONCLUSION
The positivity effect, i.e., increased attention and memory for
positive information in older as compared to younger people
is thought to play a major role in emotional well-being in
older age. Within the framework of SST, the positivity effect is
suggested to be driven by a limited FTP. However, although
FTP has been the most relevant construct in explaining the
positivity effect, questions regarding its relationship to a top-
down, motivationally driven positivity in emotion processing,
and its meaning across age groups were still open. Our findings
confirmed the presence of increased positivity in the older adults,
who more often shifted their attention to more positive stimuli
in later stages of processing (i.e., positivity shifts). We found
that age moderated the association between positivity shifts and
FTP, such that the positivity shifts were associated with more
limited FTPs in older, and more open FTPs in younger adults,
most likely stemming from a different meaning of FTP across
the age-groups. Moreover, we show that neither age, nor the
associated FTP per se were sufficient in explaining positivity
shifts, and inter-individual differences in levels of worry also
played a significant role. Our study is the first one to demonstrate
the moderator role of age in the relationship between top-
down positivity in emotion processing and FTP, with its
underlying dynamics related to socioemotional functioning. Our
findings also demonstrate the importance of studying inter-
individual differences in socioemotional functioning rather than
solely focusing on age-related differences in studies of the
positivity effect.
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